Behavioral Finance Symposium Summary Paper by Barr, Michael S. et al.
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Other Publications Faculty Scholarship 
2018 
Behavioral Finance Symposium Summary Paper 
Michael S. Barr 
University of Michigan Law School and Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, msbarr@umich.edu 
Annabel Jouard 
University of Michigan Center on Finance, Law, and Policy 
Andrew Norwich 





Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other/129 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Consumer Protection Law Commons, and the Law 
and Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Barr, Michael S, co-author. "Behavioral Finance Symposium Summary Paper." Annabel Jouard, Andrew 
Norwich, Josh Wright, and Katy Davis, co-authors. Proceedings of the Behavioral Finance Symposium 
(2018): 1-38. 
This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Other Publications by an 
authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 

BEHAVIORAL FINANCE SYMPOSIUM SUMMARY PAPER iDEAS42/UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 
II. BACKGROUND: WHAT IS BEHAVIORAL FINANCE? 5 
Beginning of the Behavioral Revolution 5 
Applying Behavioral Economics to the Financial Sector 6 
Nudges 7 
The Symposium—Why Now? 8 
III. BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AT THE MACROECONOMIC LEVEL 9 
Narrative Economics 10 
IV. WHAT DOES BIG DATA SAY ABOUT CONSUMER FINANCIAL BEHAVIOR? WHERE
SHOULD WE CONSIDER NUDGES? 11 
Nudges for Small Businesses 12 
Weathering Volatility: Big Data on the Financial Ups and Downs of U.S. Individuals 13 
Recovering from Job Loss: The Role of Unemployment Insurance 14 
The Consumer Spending Response to Mortgage Resets: Microdata on Monetary Policy 14 
V. MACRO-MARKET STABILITY: SO WHAT IF CONSUMERS ARE MANIPULATED AND 
UNHEALTHY? 16 
A Behaviorally Informed Approach to Mortgages 16 
The Limits of Regulatory Reform 17 
Restoring Trust in the Financial Sector 18 
Narratives as Models: How do we choose the right one? 19 
Why do we need consumers to have financial health? 20 
VIII. BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND SMALL BUSINESSES 20 
Microentrepreneurs and Cash Management 20 
Case Study: Mobile Phone Consulting in India 21 
Small Business Access to Credit 22 
VI. HOW CAN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE INFORM CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
POLICIES? 23 
Rational Response to Irrational Behavior: Financial Product Defects 25 
Women’s Access to Financial Systems 26 
Behaviorally Informed Financial Product Innovations 27 
Building and Maintaining Financial Health 28 
VII. INVESTOR PROTECTION: HOW DO WE MITIGATE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES? 29
Defining Investor Success 30 
Conflicts of Interest and Disclosure 31 
The Limits of Nudges 32 
Lessons from the Financial Conduct authority 33 
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND LOOKING AHEAD 34 
APPENDIX A: LIVE AUDIENCE EXPERIMENTS 35 
I. Squirrels and Fine Print 35 
II. Brochures and Change Blindness 35 
III. Fiduciary Rule and Faulty Disclosure 36 
APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY OF TERMS 38 
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE SYMPOSIUM SUMMARY PAPER iDEAS42/UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
2 
SYMPOSIUM SPEAKERS 
Bindu Ananth, Chair, Dvara Trust (formerly known as IMFR Trust) 
Karen Biddle Andres, Vice President of Network Engagement, Center for Financial Services 
Innovation 
Mehrsa Baradaran, Associate Dean for Strategic Initiatives & J. Alton Hosch Associate 
Professor of Law, University of Georgia Law School 
Michael S. Barr, Joan and Sanford Weill Dean, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, 
University of Michigan 
Phyllis Borzi, former Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor 
Andrew Caplin, Silver Professor of Economics, New York University 
James Choi, Professor of Finance, Yale University School of Management 
Shawn Cole, John G. McLean Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School 
Scott DeRue, Edward J. Frey Dean of the Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of 
Michigan 
Diana Farrell, President and CEO, JPMorgan Chase Institute 
Claire Hill, James L. Krusemark Chair in Law, University of Minnesota Law School 
Mary Ellen Iskenderian, CEO, Women’s World Banking  
John Leahy, Allen Sinai Professor of Macroeconomics at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public 
Policy, University of Michigan 
Brayden McCarthy, Vice President of Strategy, Fundera 
Jeroen Nieboer, Technical Specialist, Behavioural Economics & Data Science Unit, Financial 
Conduct Authority 
Robert J. Shiller, Sterling Professor of Economics, Yale University 
Tim Spence, Chief Strategy Officer, Fifth Third Bank 
Joseph Tracy, Executive Vice President and Senior Advisor to the President, Federal Reserve of 
Dallas 
Steve Wendel, Head of Behavioral Science, Morningstar 
Justin Wolfers, Professor of Economics, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of 
Michigan 
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE SYMPOSIUM SUMMARY PAPER iDEAS42/UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
3 
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
On September 14-15, 2017, the University of Michigan’s Center on Finance, Law, and Policy 
and behavioral science research and design lab ideas42 brought together influential leaders from 
academia, government, nonprofits and the financial sector for a two-day symposium on 
behavioral finance. Behavioral finance is the study of how behavioral biases and tendencies 
affect financial decisions, and in turn how those impact financial markets. 
Nobel laureate, Yale University economics professor, and “father” of behavioral finance Dr. 
Robert Shiller and J.P. Morgan Chase Institute CEO and former White House advisor Diana 
Farrell served as the Symposium’s keynote speakers. They joined 16 experts from a wide variety 
of backgrounds to discuss behaviorally influenced research and innovations in financial products 
and financial services and the impact of these innovations on the entire financial system. 
Speakers included representatives from financial sector regulators (in the U.S. and abroad), non-
governmental organizations committed to bolstering financial inclusion and health, private-sector 
financial services providers, and academic researchers. Panels covered macroeconomic issues 
and market stability, microenterprises and small businesses, and investor and consumer 
protection. 
In welcoming attendees, University of Michigan Ross School of Business Dean Scott DeRue 
praised the interdisciplinary nature of behavioral finance across all fields and dimensions as part 
of the larger goal of increasing social impact. Shiller discussed his research on how peoples’ 
narratives of the economy—shaped by individual experiences and stories—collectively affect 
financial markets. Farrell discussed how the JPMorgan Chase Institute uses big data to develop 
financial models for household and small businesses that align more closely to individual 
behavior, and encouraged practitioners to use those findings to design policies and products that 
improve financial stability. University of Michigan’s Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy 
Dean Michael Barr discussed how policy designers could incorporate those and other findings to 
drive healthier decision-making. 
The following themes emerged from the keynote presentations, four panels, Q&As, and 
discussions throughout the Symposium: 
 People make irrational financial decisions: Ideally, people would have infinite time and the
necessary self-control to make the best financial decision possible – but they do not. Policy
practitioners should consider the equity impacts of those types of decisions: for some, not
being able to make the right financial choice means paying a small fee or penalty; for others,
it means taking a catastrophic hit to their financial well-being. Farrell showed how an
adjustable-rate mortgage can upend household spending patterns, often to the detriment of
their financial health.
 Irrationality abounds in markets too: Behavioral biases reverberate beyond individual
decision-making into the global economy. Shiller explained how perceptions drive investors
to make irrational decisions, which causes “rational” markets to under or overvalue products.
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Law Professor Claire Hill made the case for redesigning banker compensation to align 
incentives better in the private sector. 
 What works for one group may not work for another: It is not enough to know people have
certain biases—the magnitude and direction of those biases can differ across different kinds
of customers and businesses. JP Morgan Chase Institute segmented small businesses by
industry, and was able to highlight different financial needs within each group. Professor
James Choi presented on how peer comparisons in retirement savings negatively influenced
one group, while positively impacted another. Mary Ellen Iskenderian discussed how
Women’s World Banking is helping financial service providers augment their products and
services to reach unbanked and underbanked women.
 Test, Retest and Test Again: Behavioral economics is not an exact science; unintended
consequences abound. Phylis Borzi, a former Assistant Secretary at the U.S. Department of
Labor, discussed the downsides to disclosure, including how it may foster a false feeling of
trust. Jeroen Niebor from the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority illustrated how a
modification to investment advisors’ fee mechanisms led to an advice gap in the industry.
Unbeknownst to the attendees, the symposium also included three live audience experiments 
designed by ideas42 to test some of the most well-known psychological biases documented in 
behavioral economics.1 Would an audience learning about inattentiveness find themselves 
subject to the bias? (Spoiler: overwhelmingly, the answer was yes.) 
About this paper 
This summary paper is divided into two parts. Part I defines behavioral finance, explores how 
behaviorally minded economists and others seek to depart from assumptions that have traditionally 
played an important role in modeling human behavior, and discusses the underlying policy debate 
surrounding the use of “nudges.” Part II builds upon this understanding by analyzing: consumers’ 
and small businesses’ financial well-being; the innovative “nudges” and experiments undertaken by 
symposium speakers and the organizations they represent; the limits, unintended consequences, and 
externalities that have arisen from innovation in behavioral finance; and the ways in which these 
small nudges have ripple effects throughout the entire financial system, affecting macroeconomic 
financial stability. 
Full videos of the two keynote addresses and four panel presentations are available at 
http://financelawpolicy.umich.edu/behavioral-finance-symposium/. To clarify and draw out the ideas 
interwoven among panel discussions over the two-day event, speakers’ comments are not presented 
here in the order they were discussed at the symposium, but are instead discussed by topic. 
1 While the precise nature of the experiments was not revealed in advance, all conference advertising 
mentioned an “interactive audience experiment” and conference registrants were notified three times that they 
would be recorded throughout the event: once on the conference webpage, once in the email they received 
confirming their online registration, and once when they appeared at the conference and signed a waiver form 
at the registration check-in.   
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II. BACKGROUND: WHAT IS BEHAVIORAL FINANCE?
In their groundbreaking 2008 book Nudge, economist Richard Thaler and legal scholar Cass 
Sunstein distinguished between two types of individuals: humans and Econs. Econs are “these 
strange creatures” found only in economics textbooks.2 They are unemotional, logical, and self-
controlled. Humans, by contrast, are the type of people we interact with every day. They make 
mistakes, act emotionally, and rarely act on full or perfect information. Behavioral science is the 
intersection of economic theory with psychology and neuroscience, which enables researchers to 
understand how we humans make decisions, interact with others, and respond to incentives.  
Beginning of the Behavioral Revolution 
Economics traditionally relies on models that incorporate the “rational actor” and a “rational 
choice theory,” which assumes that we live in a world of Econs, not humans. These ideas 
essentially posit that people try to maximize their advantage in any given situation by making 
rational, logical decisions. Beginning just a few decades ago, researchers began to push back 
against this rational actor model.  
In 1974, psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky published a paper, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, which examined how people make less-than-rational 
decisions in situations involving uncertainty. The authors found that people rely on heuristics, or 
mental shortcuts, to make sense of complex problems. While many of these shortcuts can be 
useful, sometimes they lead to “severe and systematic errors.” Take the availability heuristic, or 
making decisions and predicting probabilities based on what information is available and what is 
easiest to recall. A harmless example is someone deciding whether to bring an umbrella to 
work—his probability of doing so is much higher if the past few days have been rainy, since his 
memories of getting soaked are so salient. A more consequential example lies with the stock 
market. The NASDAQ and S&P500 drop in early February 2018 came as such a shock to 
investors because the American economy had been in its longest period of recovery—the 
information most readily available was an ever-upward stock market, not a more realistic 
cyclical path.3 
Many of the cognitive biases Kahneman, Tversky, and other researchers have identified have 
entered the popular lexicon, such as confirmation bias (the tendency to focus only on 
information that validates existing beliefs), or recency bias (the tendency for people to believe 
what has happened recently will continue to happen). Another is mental accounting, which 
occurs when a person views various sources of income as being different from others—think of 
how you would spend a birthday check versus wages from one additional hour of work. Other 
foundational behavioral research focuses on how visceral states (such as hunger or strong 
emotions) can distort decision-making. Behavioral finance builds on this new foundation known 
2 Thaler, Richard H., and Cass R. Sunstein. Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and 
Happiness. Yale University Press, 2008. 
3 Thakor, A. Lending booms, smart bankers, and financial crises. The American Economic Review, 105(5), 
2015, pp. 305-309. 
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as behavioral economics by broadening the scope behind individual decision-making to macro 
level system decision-making. These concepts are merely a handful of the identified biases and 
tendencies people exhibit—there are far more that affect decision-making that financial 
stakeholders aim to harness, as discussed throughout the conference and this paper. 
Applying Behavioral Economics to the Financial Sector 
Understanding how humans make financial decisions is only one piece of a complicated puzzle. 
Researchers and policymakers are also interested in how to use findings from behavioral 
economics to improve consumer financial decisions or design a financial system that better 
protects people from cyclical economic shocks. Researchers often try to understand where 
market incentives may be aligned—or misaligned—to help consumers overcome their own 
biases. In cases where financial institutions have an incentive to take advantage of consumers’ 
irrationality, policymakers could level the playing field with interventions that enhance consumer 
welfare. 
To address the ethical concerns of attempting to influence human behavior, Thaler and Sunstein 
introduce the concept of libertarian paternalism: libertarian, as people must be free to make the 
choice they want, and paternalism, as institutions should design systems that encourage healthier 
choices.4 The idea is that people do not have time to make rationally consider every option 
available to them at the grocery store, cafeteria, or bank. They rely on those heuristics, which 
allow them to make faster decisions—and choices they would not otherwise make if they were 
Econs, with an ability to always make rational decisions.  
Behavioral finance is redesigning systems so that people are more likely to make a healthier 
financial decision. Importantly, it does not force a choice. It does not affect someone’s ability to 
choose what she truly prefers, even if it is irrational. Rather, it makes it easier for her make a 
better choice just as quickly—a better choice meaning what she would eventually make, given 
infinite time and self-control.  
To illustrate the point, think about one area where consumers consistently make irrational 
choices: credit card monthly minimum payments. The minimum payment is the amount a 
cardholder must pay each month to keep her account current and avoid extra fees and penalties. 
Credit cards carry high interest rates, and companies calibrate minimum payment formulas to 
extend these high-interest repayment periods—but many Americans still only pay the minimum, 
even when they can afford more. Companies typically prominently feature the minimum on the 
credit card statement: researchers have shown the minimum acts as an anchor on which 
consumers use to decide how much to pay. One study demonstrated that when consumers had the 
amount hidden, they would make a payment up to an estimated 43 greater than the minimum.5  
4 Thaler, Richard, H., and Cass R. Sunstein. "Libertarian Paternalism." American Economic Review, 93 (2), 
2013, pp. 175-179. 
5 "A nudge in the wrong direction; Credit cards." The Economist, 13 Dec. 2008. 
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Redesigning a credit card statement does not restrict a consumer from paying whatever amount 
she likes. In this way, it maintains the libertarian principle of free choice. Changing that anchor 
she sees could result in a healthier financial decision by lessening the amount of interest she will 
need to pay. Thus, we endorse a paternalistic influence on the context in which she makes that 
decision. 
Throughout the conference, researchers, policymakers, and practitioners emphasized program 
evaluation as key a tool when applying behavioral findings to interventions: without proper 
testing, policies and programs may produce unintended consequences. At issue in this example is 
just exactly how policymakers and researchers can use behavioral insights to incentivize better 
financial outcomes, or to decide if the harm caused to consumers warrants a legislative or other 
policy response at all. One example of action in this area is the Credit Card Accountability 
Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, known as the CARD Act, which included several 
provisions designed to make credit card pricing more fair and transparent. The CARD act 
required changes to the minimum payment formula, as well as a redesign of the credit card bill to 
include a statement on how much a consumer would save in foregone interest by paying above 
the minimum. 
Consumer payments increased by an average of $19 per month in the years following 
implementation of the CARD act—but the number of consumers paying their credit card bill in 
full actually decreased as a result of the increased minimum—the opposite of the intended 
effect.6  
Nudges 
A behavioral economics concept is the nudge—a gentle push to influence behavior in a way that 
is thought to generally benefit the individual. Thaler, Sunstein and other behaviorally minded 
researchers often seek to overcome psychological barriers and traps that undermine rational 
decision-making by tackling choice architecture, or the design of the environments in which 
people make choices. There is no such thing as a neutral design: any form or choice set must 
present one option first—and people are more likely to choose the first option regardless of 
content.7 These findings have led to the rise of choice architects, or people or institutions that 
design these environments. Choice architects help decide how prominently to display certain 
features on your credit card statement, or default rules governing participation in retirement 
savings plans (e.g., are employees automatically enrolled, or must they take affirmative steps to 
enroll themselves?) 
Behavioral researchers are interested in how people interact with these environments and how 
certain interfaces, features, or options can influence consumers to make certain decisions. 
Researchers believe that, because people must choose something within a choice set, 
6 Keys, B. J., and Jialan Wang. “Minimum Payments and Debt Paydown in Consumer Credit Cards.” NBER 
Working Paper, 22742, 2016. 
7 Thaler, Richard H., and Cass R. Sunstein. Nudge, Ibid. 
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policymakers can employ data-driven behavioral insights to nudge people towards healthier 
decisions.  
A classic example of nudging is Thaler and behavioral economist Shlomo Benartzi’s program to 
increase retirement savings called ‘Save More Tomorrow’ (or ‘SMarT’). Thaler and Benartzi 
sought to address a well-known problem: a substantial proportion of employees contribute 
nothing, or very little, to their company’s defined contribution retirement plan, even when that 
means they forego matching funds (i.e., ‘free’ money) from their employers.
SMarT also allowed employees to pre-commit to increase their savings rate, and their first 
increase in savings coincides with a pay raise. Thaler and Benartzi use this strategy so that take-
home pay does not decrease with contributions—participants never see, and never miss, the 
income that goes directly into the retirement plan. This avoids triggering the mind’s 
hypersensitivity to loss. The contribution rate increases with subsequent pay raises until it 
reaches a predetermined ceiling. Inertia works in employees’ favor here, as employees do not 
have to take any further steps to continue to increase their contribution rates. 
The program worked. SMarT’s first pilot with at a midsize manufacturing company increased 
saw a rise of fund contributions from an average of 3.5 percent of salaries to 13.6 percent of 
salaries over a three-and-a-half-year period. More than half of the large employers in the United 
States now offers the program, and the Pension Protection Act of 2006 included similar to 
SMarT.  
Nudges are not only a tool for academics and legislators. Financial institutions like banks have 
also employed behavioral findings to create new and useful programs for their customers. One 
such example is a program offered by Fifth Third Bank, called Momentum, which rounds up card 
purchases and puts the difference towards customers’ student loans. As speaker Timothy Spence 
of Fifth Third noted, based on millennial debit card use patterns, the average millennial taking 
part in the program could take three years off their loan repayment by using Momentum. Other 
banking programs and even smartphone apps (like Acorns and Folio) help consumers overcome 
inertia and their own timidity to take the plunge into the stock market by investing their spare 
change.  
The Symposium—Why Now? 
At the individual level, behavioral research has uncovered a host of cognitive biases that affect 
decision-making, which can help policymakers design programs and products (like retirement 
accounts) that are better aligned with how people actually interact with them, thereby creating 
more optimal outcomes for the individuals and for larger society. Economists have empirically 
demonstrated that institutions and people are capable of mispricing financial assets for long 
stretches of time, and that psychological factors can explain swings in markets more than 
fundamental factors can.  
The housing and subsequent global financial crisis demonstrated the devastation crashing 
markets can have on the quality of life of individuals. At the individual and small business level, 
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the crisis and its resulting economic anxiety illuminated the important work policymakers and 
others have yet to do to help ordinary people manage their financial lives and absorb the 
occasional shocks from imperfect markets. At the macroeconomic, financial-system level, the 
crisis revealed that economists and regulators have a lot of work to do to understand and cool 
overheated markets. At its core, behavioral finance is about identifying and explaining 
inefficiencies and mispricing in financial markets. As Robert Shiller stated in his best seller 
Irrational Exuberance, “[h]ow we value the market now and in the future influences major 
economic and policy decisions that affect not only investors but also society at large.”  
The University of Michigan and ideas42 designed the Symposium to bring together a diverse 
group of individuals to discuss the current research in the field of behavioral finance and to 
examine how practitioners have applied or can apply this research in the real world. What 
follows are their findings. 
III. BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AT THE MACROECONOMIC LEVEL
What causes prices in speculative assets, like stocks, to change? Despite the constant media 
attention, the question has remained notoriously difficult to answer. Traditional economists 
adhere to some version of the efficient markets hypothesis, which states that fundamental metrics 
can explain market prices. In the case of stocks, traditional economists focus on metrics like 
dividend payouts, forecasts of future earnings, and similar factors to understand prices. Prices 
change as information changes, and because genuine news is by nature unpredictable, price 
changes are therefore unpredictable. Adherents of the efficient markets worldview have come up 
with statistical models and observations purportedly proving the efficiency and rationality of 
markets.  
In the 1980s, Yale economics professor Robert Shiller and other academics began to challenge 
the assumptions of rationality that formed the basis of traditional economic models. Shiller was 
an undergraduate at the University of Michigan, where he studied under professors from the 
economics, history, and psychology departments.8 These professors exposed Shiller to the idea 
that the efficient markets hypothesis might be good for “bird economies,” in that birds present 
rational behavior, but an inaccurate model for human behavior. Humans do not use advanced 
mathematical techniques to optimize their utility function before making every decision. They 
have tastes and preferences, and those can change over time. People’s tastes are instead driven 
by ideas, or narratives. 
Shiller credited a senior seminar at Michigan on Individualism versus Collectivism with instilling 
in him the idea that people “invent [economic assumptions] on the spot.” Most people do not 
maintain expectations for inflation over the next year based on complex mathematical formulas 
incorporating the latest economic indicators—instead, their environment, stories, and own 
8 Professors Kenneth Boulding, Shaw Livermore, and George Katona, respectively. Shiller still had his class 
notes from all professors, as well as the required texts, and used direct quotes from a February 17, 1966 lecture 
to help explain his work. Said Shiller, “Those of you who are teachers have to reflect that people will 
remember exactly what you say 50 years later.” 
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narratives shape their idea of the economy. Shiller’s research focuses on the cumulative 
consequences of peoples’ reliance on narratives. How do individual stories and experiences 
create market trends? How do non-economic forces shape the economy?  
In 1981, Shiller published a highly influential paper, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to Be 
Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?, where he argued that stock prices changed more 
than could be explained by fluctuations in dividends, indicating a less-than-rational market. 
Shiller attributed the larger-than-expected market variance to psychological factors. The paper 
challenged some of the existing research in favor of efficient markets. Called by one scholar “the 
first serious behavioral finance paper of the modern era,” Shiller’s paper bolstered behavioral 
finance as a serious challenger to the efficient markets hypothesis that took a more realistic view 
of human behavior.9 
Shiller’s subsequent work expanded on the idea that forces other than rational, fundamental 
features drive markets.  
Narrative Economics 
In discussing his newest research about the role of narratives in economics, Shiller spoke about 
the need for economists to study narratives and their impact on market fluctuations. Just as 
economists like Shiller used psychology and other disciplines to develop the field of behavioral 
economics, economists also need to add the study of narrative economics to their analysis. This 
sociological element examines the narratives that people carry and transmit about the overall 
economy, based on information from news, from friends, and from social media.  
Humans have always engaged with narratives, Shiller notes. The human brain is wired for 
conversation and for storytelling. Some narratives die out quickly, while others can last much 
longer as they spread from person to person like a contagion—and this element, contagion, is a 
key factor in driving how financial systems work. 
Shiller asserted that the market would crash, and he was right. To explain how irrational 
exuberance had driven the market to such a high, Shiller pointed to several cultural and 
psychological factors that could lead to speculative bubbles. Consider the excitement people 
must have felt about investing in companies using brand new, exciting technology. Or how the 
news media can “amplify stories that have resonance with investors, often regardless of their 
validity.” Shiller also analyzed psychological factors that can drive market behavior, including 
anchors, such as investors’ misguided reliance on past prices in judging the appropriate level of 
current stock prices. A more pervasive anchor is the tendency for humans to rely on storytelling 
and justification, rather than quantitative measures, to determine appropriate values. 
9 “Shiller paper cited as one of the century’s top economic articles.” Yale University Department of Economics, 
17 February 2011. 
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The rapid rise in bitcoin, one of the most well-known cryptocurrencies, is another example of the 
importance of narrative to markets. As of writing, the price of a bitcoin has risen over 600 
percent in one year.10 Shiller tied bitcoin’s surging price in 2017 to a narrative: “…we have a 
new form of money that…sounds extremely revolutionary and involves a very clever use of 
cryptography that you can spend all afternoon trying to figure out,” Shiller said during a 
September 2017 CNBC interview. “So the story has inspired young people and active people, 
and that’s what’s driving the market. It’s not like this is a fundamentally important thing, this 
bitcoin.”  
Shiller believes that economists are among the worst at appreciating narratives. He noted that 
those who do study narratives, like historians, do not often appreciate or understand the stories of 
the people who lived through historical events. When economists want to understand recessions 
or depressions, they must first understand why people took certain actions—like why they 
stopped spending money.  
To understand prior downturns, and the narratives that surrounded them, Shiller analyzed 
newspaper articles around economic shocks. Events can shape the mood of the public, and 
sentiments and narratives can drive people to act in certain ways. Having a better grasp on these 
sentiments can help economists better understand how contagious stories can move markets.  
Ultimately, Shiller argued that economists who fail to grasp the cultural feeling about the 
economy simply miss the narratives that drive economic fluctuations. Like other disciplines, 
economics has a tool kit. Understanding narratives has not traditionally been included; Shiller 
believes doing so will better equip economists to understand economic fluctuations. 
IV. WHAT DOES BIG DATA SAY ABOUT CONSUMER FINANCIAL BEHAVIOR? WHERE SHOULD
WE CONSIDER NUDGES? 
As behavioral finance has become more prominent, governments and organizations are trying to 
understand how people make decisions in economic environments, and how to deploy these 
insights to help people achieve their own goals while also creating a more stable economic 
environment. The field has exploded over the last seven years on subjects ranging from payday 
lending to subprime mortgage lending to gambling. Yet, large gaps remain in our understanding. 
Keynote speaker Diana Farrell is working to fill that gap.  
Farrell is the Founding President and CEO of the J.P. Morgan Chase Institute, a global think tank 
launched by J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. in 2015. The Institute’s mission is “to help decision 
makers—policymakers, businesses, and nonprofit leaders—appreciate the scale, granularity, 
diversity, and interconnectedness of the global economic system and use better facts, timely data 
and thoughtful analysis to make smarter decisions to advance global prosperity.”  
The Institute uses J.P. Morgan Chase’s proprietary data and $2.4 trillion balance sheet to conduct 
in-depth studies that help researchers construct patterns and glean insights about how 
10 Author’s calculations, based on prices as of March 14, 2018, via CoinDesk 
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individuals, households and small businesses manage their financial lives. Using anonymized 
datasets of the bank’s small business and retail customers, the Institute is able to conduct robust, 
in-depth analyses not previously available at that scale. What results are new insights into the 
needs of different businesses and people—and different types of businesses and people. The 
Institute also investigates how monetary policy plays out at a microeconomic level, specifically 
how changes in the federal funds target rate impacts personal consumption for individual 
households. 
Nudges for Small Businesses 
Drawing on Chase’s extensive account information, the Institute constructed a sample of about 
600,000 small businesses who hold Chase Business Banking deposit accounts to explore the 
financial lives of small businesses.11 The Institute’s 2016 Cash is King study looked at cash 
inflows, outflows and account balances over time to get a sense of the financial health of small 
businesses.  Farrell expressed that thus far, data on small business is simply not very good, due to 
their heterogeneity and dispersion—the size of this dataset allowed analysts to create synthetic 
control groups, further supporting findings.  
The Cash is King study’s main finding was that the median small business holds only a cash 
buffer of 27 days in reserve. Cash buffer days are the number of days a business could survive 
without new revenue with their cash on hand. Anything from a hurricane to unexpected 
maintenance could cause a disruption in revenue. The study found a substantial variation in cash 
buffer days for small businesses across and within industries. Small businesses in labor-intensive 
or low-wage industries average lower days in reserve, like restaurants (a median of 16 days), 
repair and maintenance (18 days), and retail (19 days). Twenty-five percent of small businesses 
had fewer than 13 cash buffer days in reserve. Importantly, the data shows that many small 
businesses may not have enough of a buffer to continue their operations during an economic 
downturn.  
11 JP Morgan Chase Institute, Cash is King: Flows, Balances, and Buffer Days. September 2016. 
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Figure 1: Cash Buffer Days by Industry, via the JP Morgan Chase Institute 
According to Farrell, the detailed data used by the Institute and the research findings on cash 
buffer days can help policymakers create interventions that help small businesses better 
understand and manage cash. The Institute’s industry segmentation data in particular can guide 
policymakers to create tailored policies for industries to serve their particular needs more 
effectively. The most effective interventions would treat labor-intensive and low-wage industries 
differently than capital-intensive and high-wage, as they have different liquidity needs. More 
generally, the importance of cash buffer days drawn out from the Cash is King study can focus 
policymakers and other interested parties on the importance of liquidity.  
Weathering Volatility: Big Data on the Financial Ups and Downs of U.S. Individuals 
The Institute also analyzed proprietary data from JPMorgan Chase to determine how household 
income and consumption fluctuate on a monthly and yearly basis. The Institute used anonymized 
consumer information and account data to analyze income and spending behaviors at a granular 
view over time to observe the timing, magnitude and sources of income and consumption 
changes.  
Farrell reported three main findings: (1) individuals across the income spectrum experienced 
high levels of income and consumption volatility; (2) income and consumption changes did not 
move in tandem—there was only a slightly positive correlation between changes in income and 
changes in consumption; and (3) the typical household did not have a sufficient financial buffer 
to weather the magnitude of income and consumption volatility observed.  
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One takeaway from this research is the untapped opportunity for service providers, employers, 
and policymakers to construct tools that help small business owners better understand and 
manage their bottom line. Such tools can also help individuals understand financial volatility and 
include analytical financial planning platforms that integrate multiple aspects of a household’s 
financial picture. 
Recovering from Job Loss: The Role of Unemployment Insurance 
The largest disruption in household income typically comes from job loss. In the wake of the 
Great Recession and the prolonged economic downturn, unemployment insurance (UI) has been 
crucial in helping families get by while dealing with an unemployment lapse. Every year, about 
one in four working adults experience a period of joblessness, and the debate surrounding the 
efficacy and extent of the UI program is often contentious. From a universe of 28 million Chase 
checking account holders, the Institute assembled an anonymized sample of 160,000 families 
who met certain criteria to evaluate the role that UI plays in mitigating the financial impacts of a 
job loss—a key source of income and expense volatility. The researchers noted that the 
Recovering from Job Loss report “is a first-ever look into comprehensive and high frequency 
measures of spending behavior among a large sample of the unemployed in the US.”  
Perhaps the most important finding of the Recovering from Job Loss study is that UI is 
“remarkably effective at preventing large spending drops among the short-term unemployed.” 
According to the researchers, UI reduces the drop in monthly family income from a 46 percent 
drop to only a 16 percent drop. 
Another important finding is that income and spending recover within 18 months for the short-
term unemployed but remain depressed for the longer-term unemployed. When UI benefits are 
less generous, the long-term unemployed experience more economic hardship but go back to 
work sooner. As the researchers note, these “findings therefore point to a potential trade-off that 
policymakers must weigh when reforming UI benefits, namely whether to reduce the time to 
reemployment or alleviate more of the economic hardship experienced by the unemployed.” 
Given the findings, one major takeaway is that UI is effective in softening the blow to families 
experiencing short-term unemployment—but UI is severely underutilized, as only 27 percent of 
those eligible for the program are enrolled. Increasing uptake of UI would improve the financial 
health of individuals. The first step policymakers could take is exploring why the enrollment 
levels are so low—possibly due to insufficient nudges. 
The Consumer Spending Response to Mortgage Resets: Microdata on Monetary Policy 
Another area in which consumers could benefit from nudges is in mortgage resets, as studied by 
the Institute.12 A mortgage is the single largest debt for most households, and represents one of 
12 JP Morgan Chase Institute, The Consumer Spending Response to Mortgage Resets: Microdata on 
Monetary Policy. April 2017. 
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the largest monthly expenditures. Owners with adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), which are 
often tied to the federal funds rate, saw a precipitous drop in monthly payments during the Fed’s 
quantitative easing after the most recent financial crisis. Creating a sample of Chase customers 
with hybrid ARMs and a Chase credit card, the Institute analyzed changes in spending and 
revolving credit card balances leading up to and after the mortgage rate reset. 
The Institute found that 44 percent of homeowners in their sample experienced a large drop in 
their hybrid ARM payment once it reset, but that homeowners typically increased their spending 
9 percent in advance of the anticipated drop in their mortgage payments and 15 percent after the 
reset. Importantly, these homeowners increased their spending despite a nearly $84,000 decrease 
in their median home value. The Microdata on Monetary Policy study also found that 
homeowners used credit card borrowing to finance 21 percent of their anticipatory spending 
increase. After the reset, these homeowners further increased their revolving balances. In both 
the pre-reset and the post-reset periods, spending increased in every category and the 
discretionary spending increase exceeded the non-discretionary spending increase. Over the 
study’s time period, homeowners’ total spending increase exceeded their mortgage-related 
savings by 4 percent.  
Figure 2: Cumulative average change in income, spending, & revolving balance, via the JP Morgan Chase Institute 
Microdata on Monetary Policy has implications for policymakers, as they should consider the 
effects their policies have on personal consumption. Research studies like the ones Farrell 
described are important tools because they do not rely on surveying consumers about their 
behavior, which is oftentimes unreliable. Surveys and observations also cannot come close to 
aggregating the sophisticated, detailed and granular data the Institute can examine by leveraging 
Chase’s customer data. By examining this data, researchers can get a complete picture about how 
people behave in the real world and how they respond to various financial events. For 
policymakers, these insights illustrate where and why everyday Americans struggle and the kinds 
of interventions that may be able to provide relief. For financial institutions, these insights can 
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE SYMPOSIUM SUMMARY PAPER iDEAS42/UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
16 
help them design financial resources and products that address important problems their 
customers face.  
V. MACRO-MARKET STABILITY: SO WHAT IF CONSUMERS ARE MANIPULATED AND
UNHEALTHY? 
The Symposium’s final panel focused on improving stability of the financial system. Whereas 
the prior three panels examined the relationship between financial institutions and customers, 
small business owners and investors, the macro-market stability panel went inside the financial 
institution itself to explore what behavioral insights can tell us about how these organizations are 
organized, what incentives they have to take risks and what incentives they have to balance 
against that risk-taking.  
A Behaviorally Informed Approach to Mortgages 
Economist Andrew Caplin examined the 2008 housing crisis and policymakers’ response to it. 
“The crisis has been dealt with very badly,” Caplin stated back in 2011. “Every single policy has 
pushed people further away from re-entering the U.S. lending market.”13 In Caplin’s view, the 
United States housing market will face an “affordability” crisis induced by tightened lending 
standards. In this situation, homeownership rates will fall to levels not seen in decades, and this 
reduction in home ownership will create incentives to extend credit to marginal borrowers.  
Caplin’s response to the crisis is the development of “shared appreciation mortgage” (SAM) 
markets in the United States. These markets would moderate the impending decline in home 
ownership and dampen debt-driven housing crises. A SAM allows the purchaser to pay a given 
amount of the loan balance to the lender by passing along a portion of the gain in value of the 
property. In turn, the lender charges an interest rate that is below the prevailing market rate. 
SAMs allow the lender to recoup the balance of the interest charged when the property is sold.14 
The first advantage of this mechanism relates to timing: a SAM replaces monthly payments over 
the life of the loan with a lump sum at its termination. This timing advantage is particularly 
useful to younger households. The second advantage, to Caplin, relates to risk sharing. Because 
the cost of SAM finance is low when the home’s value decreases and high when it appreciates, it 
spreads the risk. Caplin thinks this situation is preferable because the combination of debt and 
equity spreads risk across the financial system, reducing the chance that individual homeowners 
summer when home prices decline.  
Caplin thinks the earlier availability of SAMs would have prevented the recent housing crisis 
from becoming as pervasive as it was. Still, development of SAM markets in the United States 
13 Maag, Christopher. “To save mortgages, should we share them?” Credit.com, 18 July 2011. 
14 For a full exploration of the SAM and its potential, see: Caplin, Andrew, et al. Facilitating Shared 
Appreciation Mortgages to Prevent Housing Crashes and Affordability Crises. Brookings Institution Press, 
Washington, 2008. 
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remains unlikely due to obstacles like those imposed by current tax law. In light of the recent 
crisis, however, scholars like Caplin are interested in continuing to find ways to craft smarter 
regulations and products to protect individuals from the ups and downs of markets. 
The Limits of Regulatory Reform 
Claire Hill focused on the limits of regulatory 
reform. Since the financial crisis, and after 
Congress passed major financial legislation 
aimed at curbing banks’ excessive risk-taking, 
scandals involving banks continued to pile up. 
In Hill’s view, regulatory reform aimed at 
improving banker behavior has had little on the 
root of the problem—banking culture, or ethos 
as Hill refers to it. 
Hill identified three types of problematic banker 
behavior. The first is irresponsible risk-taking 
from both a financial and legal perspective, 
which has negative consequences on society if 
the risks do not pay off. The second is 
conflicted behavior, which occurs when banks 
sell products to customers they think will not 
figure out the product is bad or ill-suited for 
them. The third type of problematic behavior is 
what the authors call “financial maneuvering,” 
which involves banks searching for loopholes 
around regulations or contract provisions. 
Financial regulation must address this behavior 
to affect true change, “but changing behavior—
as opposed, say, to imposing higher capital requirements—is a complex task.”15 
Hill looks back at banking’s history and argues for a bit of a return to the old days. Her response 
to a distorted ethos is covenant banking, which in her view would recreate in part the economic 
relationship and some of the psychological dispositions that bankers had when investment banks 
were general partnerships rather than corporations. Covenant banking would make financial 
executives personally liable for a portion of any fines and fraud-based judgments a bank enters 
into, including legal settlements. Hill’s plan contains a no-fault element, requiring certain 
bankers to be liable for a fine whether or not they were engaged in the wrongdoing.  
Hill said that such a provision would use psychology to change their behaviors, motivating 
bankers to behave ethically and legally and to watch out for misbehavior and wrongdoing among 
15 Morgenson, Gretchen, “Fining Bankers, Not Shareholders, For Bankers’ Misconduct.” The New York Times, 
6 February 2016. 
Question for the speakers: 
What is the best instrument to drive 
culture change towards behaviorally-
informed macroeconomies? 
 Hill: Minimizing moral hazard, by
increasing the burden of risk on top
executives through a shareholder vote
 Leahy: we are a long way from
incorporating narratives into formal
models necessary for high-level
financial policy decisions; it will take
time to amend and extend existing
models to capture behavioral failures
 Tracy: it is a coordination game; it
will be much easier to drive change if
all firms in the market commit to
doing so
 Caplin: a behavioral flaw is one can
sin by omission, without retribution;
people and firms need to be held
accountable for not taking action
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other employees. In addition, such an agreement would work to eliminate the problem of 
regulatory capture, where banking regulators act in the interest of the entities they are supposed 
to watch over. Even if firms do not adopt such policies internally, Hill believes can regulators 
have mechanisms in place to enforce such a regime, for example by settling cases on the 
condition that banks pay out fines from their bonus pools.16  
Restoring Trust in the Financial Sector 
Echoing some of the same sentiments as Claire Hill was Joseph Tracy of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas. Tracy kicked off his talk by noting the public’s deep mistrust for and the lack of 
confidence in the financial sector. This deep mistrust largely stems from the well-documented 
misconduct by prominent financial institutions leading up to the financial crisis. Tracy noted that 
the post-crisis financial regulation has largely ensured that banks have more capital and adequate 
liquidity to make them more resilient to market shocks.  
Similar to Hill, Tracy does not believe the regulations address a principal failing of some banks: 
their failure to take care of their customers. One can see how Hill’s conception of the 
problematic banking ethos is also a concern for Tracy.  
How to address such misconduct? The current responses do not deter the behavior nor cover the 
cost of it. Furthermore, moral hazard, or risk-taking by those who do not bear its consequences, 
has permeated the financial system. For instance, the fines levied on Wells Fargo for their 
misconduct with consumer accounts were borne by shareholders, not the people who caused or 
could have prevented the problem. And for many firms, fines are looked at as an accepted cost of 
doing business, not an effective deterrent against misconduct in the first place. While some 
former Wells Fargo executives agreed to compensation clawbacks, Tracy noted that these 
agreements often do not cover the full cost of fines. In addition, compensation can be difficult 
and costly for banks to recover, particularly to former employees. More regulation and legal 
enforcement, however, is not the answer and can in fact be counter-productive, as it may create 
the perception that what is not prohibited is in fact permitted. 
Whereas Hill’s response to the banking sector’s problem is to enforce covenant banking, Tracy’s 
argues that performance bonds can curb misbehavior for bankers (senior managers and “material 
risk takers,” like traders).17 The banks could structure performance bonds as incentive 
compensation, and design them to discourage banker misconduct and ultimately enhance 
financial stability by changing the culture in finance.  
Currently, bankers’ pay generally consists of salary and bonus in the form of current cash plus 
deferred equity compensation that typically vests over three years. A performance bond could 
split the deferred pay into deferred equity (that continues to vest over three years) and a 
16 For an in-depth discussion of banker ethos and covenant banking, see Hill, Claire A. and Richard W. 
Painter. Better bankers, better banks. University of Chicago Press, 2015. 
17 Tracy, Joseph and Hamid Mehran. “Performance Bonds for Bankers: Taking Aim at Misconduct,” The New 
York Fed: Liberty Street Economics. 9 November 2016. 
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performance bond consisting of cash that is deferred for five years and that vests over the next 
five years. According to Tracy, the longer vesting and payout period increases the likelihood that 
problems will come to light before deferred cash is paid out to the bankers.  
Narratives as Models: How do we choose the right one? 
Building on Dr. Shiller’s talk on narrative economics from the prior day, John Leahy asserted 
that economists are natural storytellers, but they call their stories models. Models provide 
narratives on how the world works, but there can be many models for one market even within the 
organization, like the Fed—which might differentiate by using varying inputs and goals, from 
historical correlations to optimizing behavior. The fundamental issue, he argues, lies with 
choosing which model to use in designing effective financial policies.  
There have been many stories—or models—that explain why output was increasing at a high rate 
right before the financial crisis, but then settled into at a much slower rate even after the 
economy entered a recovery period. 
There are competing models that can explain this change, each of which presents different policy 
implications. One model, or narrative, is that the initial growth rate was our baseline—so the 
economy should be growing at pre-crisis levels (or more), which suggests our current economy 
has a huge output gap. That would necessitate aggressive economic expansion policies through 
government spending. An alternative model reasons the change was the market correcting 
unsustainable, excessive growth—and our current rate is the new normal. Following that 
narrative, government spending would be ineffective. We would need new regulations that 
fundamentally change how the American economy functions. 
Complicating these competing models, Leahy argues, is the fact that people are not good at 
processing information. People generally do not have the attention, expertise, or cognitive 
capacity to create stories and theories for complex, macro issues. Instead, they rely on the 
narratives available to them that fit their worldview—which can leads people to adopt false or 
faulty narratives. People often do not know the validity of these narratives until after the fact, 
which makes it even harder to know the right story to regulate against. To Leahy, preceding each 
crisis is a widespread and seemingly sound narrative that the economy is doing fine.  
It is important to be aware that some people pick convenient stories to fit a policy goal, or for 
reasons other than sound logic and reasoning. In this world with a menu stories to choose from, 
people tend to focus on stories that have elements of truth and fiction in them. It is much more 
convenient to choose beliefs that fit your own aims. Leahy is pessimistic about being able to stop 
crises from occurring, but thinks the community needs to do a better job of containing a crisis 
once one does hit. That cushion comes from the banking system in the form of available credit to 
make up for overleveraged and overvalued assets. 
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Why do we need consumers to have financial health? 
Dr. Justin Wolfers of the Ford School of Public Policy provided a behavioral economist’s 
perspective on how to study well-being and financial health. For behavioral economists, it is 
important to flesh out the assumptions underlying reasons policymakers and others are trying to 
stimulate or grow the economy in certain ways, as well as to understand how these changes will 
impact people’s well-being.  
Wolfers discussed research he conducted with Betsy Stevenson, also of the Ford School, about 
the relationship between income and well-being. The research has combated the famous 1974 
“Easterlin Paradox,” which claimed that while rich people are happier than poor people, rich 
countries are not happier than poor countries—and as countries got richer, they did not get 
happier. Other researchers have since modified the Easterlin Paradox, acknowledging the 
existence of a link between income and well-being among unmet basic needs, but claiming that 
beyond a certain income threshold, further income is unrelated to well-being.  
Wolfers and Stevenson found that rich countries are indeed happier than poorer ones, and as 
countries get richer, they get happier. Further, on a logarithmic scale, the slope of the 
relationship between income and happiness is virtually the same in each country: so, for each 10 
percent increase in income, a resident of Mexico is just as happy as a resident of Japan.18 
Wolfers’s and Stevenson’s ideas have policy implications, both in the United States and abroad. 
In the United States, the research implicates thorny and controversial political issues like tax 
policy, wealth redistribution, the minimum wage, and government benefits. Wolfers’s findings 
also demonstrate the importance of economic growth and development in less mature countries, 
as “…the extra hundred dollars in the developing world gives [the recipient] so much more 
happiness than it [costs the giver].” 
VIII. BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND SMALL BUSINESSES
As discussed, behavioral economics and finance has shed light on the various biases that lead 
individuals into making less-than-rational decisions. These insights have particular importance in 
the small business sector. After all, individuals who are subject to the same tendencies as 
consumers run small businesses and microenterprises.  
Microentrepreneurs and Cash Management 
Bindu Ananth is the Chair of the Dvara Trust, whose mission is to ensure that every individual 
and enterprise has complete access to financial services. Ananth touched on several topics, 
noting that advances in microfinance have occurred but that small businesses need a lot of help. 
She noted three anomalies in how microentrepreneurs, particularly those in emerging markets, 
manage their cash. These anomalies are: (1) persistence in borrowing cycles without expansion; 
18 For an in-depth discussion of the analysis and results, see Stevenson, Betsey and Justin Wolfers. “Subjective 
Well-Being And Income: Is There Any Evidence Of Satiation?” NBER Working Paper. 18992, 2013. 
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(2) a lack of joint ventures; and (3) labor and investment allocation decisions, which may be the 
result of failures in other markets. These observations illustrate the finances of the poor, and 
understanding these anomalies can help microfinance institutions to improve program and 
product designs. 
Ananth mentioned that it is surprising how many microentrepreneurs find themselves in 
persistent borrowing cycles—in perpetual debt. Oftentimes these individuals finance their 
operations with high-interest rate debt. Ananth gave some promising examples of innovative 
financial products to address this need, including a daily bank loan that expands based on a 
business’s sales. Startup capital traditionally came in the form of large loans expected to cover 
months or years of expenses—something for which many businesses could not make a 
convincing case. A shorter-term credit model 
lowers barriers to entry, making capital more 
accessible and less risky for investors. 
Case Study: Mobile Phone Consulting in India 
Shawn Cole of the Harvard Business School 
discussed how small firms around the world 
can improve business practices and increase 
performance and profitability. Cole found—as 
other speakers had mentioned—that financial 
literacy and business education programs do 
not typically translate to better business 
outcomes. Perhaps these programs are too 
boring, preachy or complicated—the reasons 
why financial education programs can be 
ineffective is unclear.  
Cole focused on agricultural productivity 
throughout the world. While there have been 
attempts to explain differences in productivity, 
Cole’s research sought to determine what kinds 
of interventions can help small businesses 
succeed, particularly whether management 
practices can explain variations in agricultural 
productivity. Cole noted that consulting has 
shown promise in certain contexts, like advising poor farmers in India.  
Cole described research that evaluated a service that provides mobile phone-based agricultural 
consulting to poor farmers in India. Traditionally, India’s government operated a system of 
“agricultural extension,” which is intended to spread information to farmers on new agricultural 
practices through a network of public extension agents. Cole sought to understand if a consulting 
program based on mobile phone-based technology could work to improve farming practices and 
business outcomes. The service, called Avaaj Otalo (AO), advises farmers on best agricultural 
Question for the speakers: 
Where do you see any opportunities for 
increasing behaviorally informed products 
or services? 
 McCarthy: increase information on
credit cards and other products before
someone opens an account, so
consumers can fully understand the
contract they are signing
 Cole: leverage the increasing use of
algorithms to create a better-designed
choice set tailored to consumers
 Ananth: replicate FinTech companies’
focus on customer experience and
insights across the financial sector
 Wolfers: redesign economics
education, by acknowledging
consumers act irrationally, so more
people can understand and engage with
the subject
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE SYMPOSIUM SUMMARY PAPER iDEAS42/UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
22 
management practices without an enormous price tag. The program allowed farmers to call into a 
hotline, ask questions and receive advice and answers from agricultural scientists. AO also 
allowed advisors to send messages to farmers to advise them on certain issues. It was, in Cole’s 
words, a “two-way learning system to get and send information.”  
Cole’s experiment had promising results. Cole found that a mobile phone-based consulting 
program could indeed help poor farmers achieve better outcomes, as farmers had a 7 percent 
higher cotton yield and a 24 percent higher cumin yield. Cole also found that there was 
considerable demand among farmers for high-quality agricultural information. The program was 
able to deliver timely, relevant, and actionable information and advice to farmers at dramatically 
lower cost than any traditional service (the service cost about $0.60 per farmer per month), and it 
significantly broadened farmers’ sources for information. The service allowed farmers to rely 
less on commissions-motivated agricultural input dealers for some information. The study also 
found that the farmers adopted better management practices that led to better results.19 
While experiments like agricultural productive one has shown promise, there are potential issues 
researchers and policymakers need to overcome. Sometimes markets for advice do not work well 
for several reasons. For instance, there is a scalability problem. How does an organization reach 
millions of poor farmers in India? Moreover, sometimes it is hard to determine what kind of 
information the recipients need to improve their business practices. Also, sometimes consulting 
services can reinforce behavioral biases.  
Small Business Access to Credit 
Brayden McCarthy, the Vice President of Strategy at Fundera, focused on challenges facing the 
small business sector. Fundera is an online credit marketplace that seeks to simplify the lending 
process to help small businesses secure loans.  
McCarthy specifically focused on the search costs of obtaining credit. Reports demonstrate that 
small businesses can spend 24 to 48 hours filling out applications at banks, getting rejected, 
going to other banks and filling out the same information. Small businesses make up almost half 
of private-sector output—those 48 hours per business translates to an enormous productivity 
loss. Small businesses also face high turndown rates at both national banks and smaller banks, 
and often do not receive the full amount requested. Because credit is absolutely vital to small 
businesses, who do not have access to the public debt and equity markets like larger companies, 
a number of new entrants in the financial technology (FinTech) sector have stepped up to fill the 
large gap left by larger banks. 
Explosive growth—and a severe lack of regulation—in the FinTech sector has led McCarthy and 
others to describe the state of the marketplace as the “wild west.” To a large extent, the 
marketplace relies on “industry-driven self-policing.” McCarthy argued that the generally 
unsupervised nature of the industry is cause for concern and that more regulation and certainty in 
19 Cole, Sean, & Fernando, A. Nilesh. “The Value of Advice: Evidence from Mobile Phone-Based 
Agricultural Extension.” Harvard Business School of Finance Working Paper, 13-047, 2012. 
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this area is welcome. Currently, a number of regulatory players have overlapping authority in the 
space, but oftentimes small business lenders and new online entrants into the market fall through 
the cracks.  
This lack of regulation often leaves small business borrowers unprotected. To McCarthy this is a 
problem, because it is important to recognize that small business owners are subject to similar 
financial constraints that plague individual consumers. For instance, the ability for many small 
businesses to absorb occasional shocks is no different from consumers; these owners often do not 
have much of a cash buffer to make it through the inevitable decline in business. The JP Morgan 
Chase Institute’s research reaffirmed this finding. In addition, McCarthy noted that small 
business owners are often prone to making less-than-rational decision-making. Some of 
McCarthy’s research has sought to understand how owners choose between multiple credit 
options. Owners often choose the most convenient or the largest option, bypassing other 
important factors in reaching a sound decision—or, relying on heuristics to make decisions. A 
better choice set would make it easier for small business owners to choose the right option. 
Ultimately, McCarthy thinks new industry players that address serious needs, like Fundera, are 
good. The rapid rise of new small business lending outlets has led to innovation and competition 
while giving small businesses new access to the credit they desperately need. Limited oversight, 
however, leaves small business owners vulnerable to predatory business practices. McCarthy 
noted that real problems do exist, including high costs, double dipping (the process of partially 
double-charging repeat customers with additional fees when they renew a loan before the term of 
the original loan is complete), hidden fees, and misaligned broker incentives. While industry 
self-policing is necessary and useful, more formal regulation and certainty is necessary.  
VI. HOW CAN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE INFORM CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
POLICIES? 
Behavioral finance in the consumer context examines why and how individuals make financial 
choices. Optimally, researchers and policymakers would use these findings to craft smarter 
policies, and institutions would use behavioral insights to create new resources and products that 
help customers make healthy financial choices. Dean Michael Barr of the Ford School of Public 
Policy, and director of the Center for Finance, Law, and Policy, moderated a panel that included 
a law professor, a vice president from a large bank, an expert in women’s banking, and an expert 
on financial health in the U.S.  
Barr first provided more detail on how consumers make financial decisions. The standard, linear 
process of a decision, then action, then result, is inaccurate, yet many practitioners design 
policies using this model. There are multiple barriers to making healthy financial decisions, 
including a lack of time to spend, attention to give, or information to collect. Consumers are also 
subject to a number of biases, rely on heuristics, and generally do not have the ability to make 
rational decisions. 
The issue—and opportunity for policymakers and practitioners—lies with the private market’s 
interaction with consumer biases. If a consumer procrastinates signing up for the earned income 
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tax credit because the process appears too complicated, that limits his ability to pay for the things 
he needs. In this case, the private market has an incentive to help correct consumer biases. Tax 
filing companies would use that as an opportunity to increase their customer base by presenting 
an easy process with which consumers can apply.  
Market and consumer incentives are not always aligned. If a consumer misunderstands 
compound interest, and therefore applies for a loan without fully knowing the consequences, the 
bank has an incentive to maximize interest payments. Here is where policymakers can have a 
positive effect, by realigning private and consumer incentives.  
Figure 3: The Firm and the Individual, via Behaviorally Informed Financial Services Regulation20 
The table above shows the effects of aligned and misaligned incentives. Barr explained that 
policymakers can resolve this through changing the rules and or changing the scoring. Rules 
shape what is available to consumers: for example, changing the enrollment default in a 
401(k) plan, or requiring credit card companies to display the consequences of compounding 
interest on monthly statements. Changing the scoring, in contrast, shape how consumers’ 
decisions affect firms. Policymakers could affect the scoring by providing a tax benefit for 
firms with high or equitable enrollment in its 401(k) plan, or require firms to deposit a 
portion of the fees collected from high-cost borrowing into a financial education program. 
Another scoring change for 401(k) plans is adjusting the stickiness of an opt-out system. If 
opting out of a plan that takes money out of your paycheck each month is easy, then many 
will opt out. Stickiness increases the transaction costs, making a consumer less likely to 
20 For a comprehensive overview of behaviorally informed financial regulation, see: Barr, Michael, Sendhil 
Mullainathan, and Eldar Shafir. Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy, Chapter 26: “Behaviorally Informed 
Financial Services Regulation, Princeton University Press, 2008. Figure adapted from a version of the chapter 
prepared for the Asset Building Program, via New America Foundation. 
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE SYMPOSIUM SUMMARY PAPER iDEAS42/UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
25 
change their situation. If it is somewhat difficult, or sticky, then more consumers will remain 
in the plan.  
Policymakers must also consider equity implications when designing behaviorally informed 
products and programs. One intervention would not work for every consumer. If someone is 
living paycheck to paycheck, it is not in her best interest to save at the maximum allowance 
in her company’s 401(k) plan. A sticky opt-out plan would do more harm than good. 
Behavioral interventions can still help those with little income to spare. Increasing direct 
deposits, for example, decreases a consumer’s likeliness to spend extraneous cash—yet most 
employers of low-wage jobs do not offer direct 
depositing, as it increases already high turnover 
costs21. Income is safer and more profitable in a 
savings account. Regulators could use rules or 
scoring to increase direct deposits; figure 422 
illustrates more examples of changing the rules 
and scoring to realign market and consumer 
incentives.  
A consumer cannot utilize a direct deposit if they 
do not have access to a bank in the first place, 
however. Mehrsa Baradaran, below, explains this 
access gap and other impacts of market 
exploitation on low- and moderate-income 
households.  
Rational Response to Irrational Behavior: 
Financial Product Defects 
Law professor Mehrsa Baradaran examined 
structural defects in America’s banking system to 
explain the ostensibly irrational choices of some low-income 
Americans, like taking out high-interest rate loans or paying high 
fees to send money to family members. Baradaran examined the 
accessibility of mainstream financial institutions, and believes 
understanding and reforming the environment in which struggling 
individuals must make economic choices is necessary.  
Banking deserts, or communities without sufficient or substantial financial service providers, 
leave an estimated 40 million Americans underbanked. While the wealthy middle class are able 
to access a “mainstream, regulated, federally subsidized banking sector,” the underbanked must 
21 Barr, Michael S. No Slack: the Financial Lives of Low-income Americans. Brookings Institution Press, 2012. 
22 Barr, Michael, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Eldar Shafir. Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy, Ibid. 
Figure 4: Behaviorally Informed 
Regulation, via Behaviorally 
Informed Financial Services 
Regulation23 
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navigate a “wild west hodgepodge of unregulated lenders that provide services to lower income 
[populations] at very high costs.” Because of this disparity, it is “expensive to be poor.” The 
underbanked pay as much as 10 percent of their income on routine financial transactions, like 
cashing checks, paying monthly bills or sending money. In her book, How the Other Half Banks, 
Baradaran noted that the average unbanked family earning $25,000 a year spends more on 
finance than it does on food.23 
To increase access to banks, Baradaran proposed that the United States once again use its 
national Postal Service to provide basic financial services to low-income Americans. Postal 
banks would provide a range of transactions and services, and could remain affordable from the 
economies of scale gained from a national network. Because of the extensive postal office 
infrastructure, the unbanked and underbanked would have more access to better financial 
services than they currently do. She described the United States’ prior use of postal banking as 
“the most successful experiment in financial inclusion in U.S. history,” and noted that the idea 
remains an important tool for financial inclusion throughout the world.24  
Women’s Access to Financial Systems 
Mary Ellen Iskenderian, the President and CEO of global nonprofit Women’s World Banking, 
also focused on issues with access to traditional banking services—but with a focus on women. 
There are differences in how male and female consumers engage with financial institutions, 
products, and other resources, Iskenderian noted. Due to barriers that often isolate women, there 
are roughly one billion completely unbanked women in the world.  
Oftentimes financial institutions fail to consider that men and women bank differently, and do 
not adequately design products tailored to women, or do not properly train client-facing staff to 
serve women with these products. Women, however, tend to be more loyal—and therefore more 
profitable—customers in the long run.  
Women throughout the world consistently report similar barriers to inclusion. One factor is 
physical distance. In many areas, women typically stay closer to home than men do. 
Organizations need to seek new ways to connect with women to ensure they have access to 
traditional banking services.  
Another factor is what Iskenderian described as “behavioral space,” which is the emotional 
distance between women’s needs and the resources and messaging their banking institutions 
provide to them. Some women do not feel connected to financial service providers, or feel that 
the service providers do not want to meet their needs. Indeed, many women typically report that 
23 Baradaran, Mehrsa. How the Other Half Banks: Exclusion, Exploitation, And the Threat to Democracy. 
Harvard University Press, 2015 
24 In addition to How The Other Half Banks, see Baradaran, Mehrsa, “It’s Time for Postal Banking.” UGA 
Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 2014-07.  
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their local institutions do not sufficiently represent their interests. This disconnect makes women 
less likely to engage with these institutions, oftentimes remaining unbanked.  
For instance, Iskenderian described her organization’s partnership with the Pakistani mobile 
banking company JazzCash. JazzCash is “an actual bank account that is tagged with your mobile 
number and can be operated through your phone” to send and receive money or to make deposits 
or withdrawals. In this sense, JazzCash usefully breaks down the barrier of physical distance by 
allowing women to conduct typical banking services with their mobile phone.25  
Iskenderian noted that initially, women’s usage rate remained low with the program, even though 
the program seemingly broke down a major barrier between women’s interactions with 
institutions. The principal way JazzCash brought new customers on board was through an agent 
network. Most of those agents were men, and signup 
required the customer to provide the agent with 
personal information, like a phone number—something 
Pakistani women were uncomfortable doing, thus 
exacerbating the behavioral space and emotional 
distance between them and banks. 
JazzCash illustrates the importance of program design. 
Institutions must carefully evaluate their programs to 
uncover and mitigate unintended consequences. Minor 
tweaks in choice architecture can have big differences 
in the ways individuals interact with them. It is 
incumbent on choice architects to evaluate their 
products and intended effects. JazzCash illustrates the 
important of knowing your audience and understanding 
that men and women may interact with institutions 
differently. Women’s World Banking provides 
institutions with training in these areas to ensure that 
they can adequately reach women.  
Behaviorally Informed Financial Product Innovations 
Tim Spence, Chief Strategy Officer of Fifth Third 
Bank, offered a contrasting perspective to Baradaran 
and Iskenderian as the representative of a large, 
mainstream bank. Spence argued that large banks are in 
great position to promote financial inclusion and the well-being of their customers due to their 
size and sophistication. Though he admitted that banks do have opportunities to exploit 
25 Eighty-seven percent of Pakistani households own mobile phones, as of 2014 (Siddiqui, Khurram. “87% of 
Pakistani households own cellphones, only 6.8% have internet connection: survey,” The Express Tribune. 3 
February 2014); for comparison, about 90 percent of U.S. households owned a mobile phone in 2014 (“Mobile 
Fact Sheet,” Pew Research Center, Accessed 12 March 2018.) 
Question for the speakers: 
You are in a room full of young 
academics. What would you like 
studied? 
 Spence: Has the corrosive effect of
the new disposable sentiment (fast
fashion, one day shipping) affected
our capacity to build financial
health and equity ownership?
 Andres: How much time does it take
for healthy (or unhealthy) financial
assets to grow?
 Iskenderian: Why are banks not
independently pursuing increasing
their female customer base, which
is often more loyal and profitable?
 Baradaran: How do we understand
financial health in a broader,
intergenerational context?
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consumer misunderstandings for short-term gain, Spence argued that the greater value comes in 
helping consumers lead healthier financial lives. Ultimately, better performing customer leads to 
better bank performance.  
The issue, of course, is to figuring out the right intervention and outreach work to improve 
consumers’ financial lives. Spence’s role at Fifth Third gives him insights into works and what 
does not. Spence agreed with his fellow panelists in that many financial education programs do 
not work as well as intended. It is not clear to Spence that individuals are leading better financial 
lives despite the financial education available to them.  
But Fifth Third has experimented leveraging behavioral insights to create new, smarter financial 
tools designed to assist customers—what Spence called “behaviorally informed product 
innovation.” One example, mentioned earlier, is the mobile app Momentum, which helps 
customers pay off student loan debt. Momentum rounds up debit card transactions and uses the 
excess to pay off the principal amount on a user’s student loans.  
What’s at work with Momentum? Behavioral research demonstrates that individuals are sensitive 
to large payments but insensitive to small payments.26 By rounding up daily transactions, 
Momentum takes advantage of consumers’ insensitivity to small amounts. Over time, these small 
amounts add up. Moreover, Momentum is automated—once users sign up with the program, 
there’s nothing else they have to do. Therefore these individuals are more likely to stick with the 
program. Although as of the date of the conference Momentum was in its infancy, Spence 
estimated that the average millennial will take three years off of their loan repayment based on 
debit card spending patterns.  
Spence’s main point was that banks like Fifth Third with financial sophistication, vast customer 
bases, and strong reputations have the infrastructure to commit to programs that help their 
customers lead better financial lives. This, rather than financial literacy classes, is the way to 
serve customers better.  
Building and Maintaining Financial Health 
Karen Biddle Andres, of the Center for Financial Services Innovation (CFSI), offered a useful 
link between the problems pointed out by Baradaran and Iskenderian and the hope articulated by 
Spence. CFSI’s research has shown that 57 percent of American adults struggle financially, as 
many deal with an “unhealthy amount of debt, irregular income, and sporadic savings habits.” 
CFSI seeks to understand how Americans can overcome these issues to build better financial 
health.  
CFSI studied underserved consumers—those who have a traditional bank account but who 
nevertheless must resort to alternative sources to meet their daily needs, like payday lenders. 
These are not issues affecting only low-income households, nor are they issues all low-income 
26 Haisle, Emily, et al. “Myopic risk seeking: The impact of narrow decision bracketing on lottery play”. 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 2008, pp. 37-57 
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households face. CFSI found that to be financially healthy, a household’s level of income matters 
less than its volatility. According to their research, one third of financially healthy families make 
less than $60,000 a year, and one third of financially unhealthy families make more than $60,000 
a year. Those that are financially unhealthy are far more likely to have unpredictable income. 
Figure 5: Mismatch of Income and Spending, via U.S. Financial Diaries 
When income is unpredictable, consumers often rely on costly debt products to make ends meet. 
Those products cost American consumers $173 billion annually—which Andres sees as an 
opportunity to design better products. To Andres, it is in understanding this portion of Americans 
who are not fully integrated into the mainstream financial system that she believes can bridge 
people like Baradaran, who focus on access issues, and Spence at Fifth Third, which focuses on 
how to help their customers lead better financial lives.  
Behaviorally informed product offerings may be a small step towards better engagement between 
institutions and consumers that can have positive results for both parties. In essence, Andres’s 
mission is to challenge the role of financial services institutions. These institutions need to 
answer fundamental questions, like why they are in business and who are they designed to serve. 
Andres even mentioned the possibility of being able to make the year-over-year change in 
financial health a key performance indicator that banks provide in their annual reports, based on 
their outreach mechanisms and product or resource offerings.  
VII. INVESTOR PROTECTION: HOW DO WE MITIGATE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES?
Behavioral research and innovation in the investment and retirement realm is important given the 
stakes involved: Consumers rely on financial institutions and their agents to make decisions 
regarding their financial futures. Take defined contribution retirement accounts, such as 401(k)s: 
when someone leaves one job for another, they have the option of moving their previous account 
to their new employer, leaving it with their old employer, rolling it over into an IRA (depending 
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on the amount), or cashing out. Here, framing, or the way in which someone or something 
presents information, plays an important role in peoples’ behavior. The best option depends on 
the individual’s financial situation, but that context is typically not available. Instead, the tone of 
the information provided to the consumer implies they should move her funds. Furthermore, it is 
one decision that usually is prompted during departure, when the person leaving the job is 
already inundated with tasks and to-dos. In this case, the decision framework is nudging 
consumers in the ‘wrong’ direction, or a direction they would not have otherwise chosen given 
enough time and information. 
To solve this problem, University of Michigan Professor Dana Muir, from the Ross School of 
Business, has suggested both modifying the decision timeline and changing the way in which 
fund accounts communicate a consumer’s options. By changing the framing, policymakers can 
nudge consumers towards a choice that aligns closer to those needs. Muir recommends first 
providing participants with a clear outline of their options, without any encouragement or 
pressure to make a decision. This simplifies the environment in which the participant is making a 
choice. She would then be required to wait a predetermined amount of time before being able to 
decide if, or where, to move the account funds. With a more complete understanding of her 
options, and in a more stable place than mid-transition, the participant is able to make a healthier 
choice. 
Given the multitude—and sometimes divergent—interests of institutions and customers, finding 
interventions that genuinely help consumers can be difficult. The investor protection panel 
brought together individuals from various angles of the investment advice space to offer their 
thoughts on how policymakers and institutions can do a better job serving customers. 
Defining Investor Success 
Steve Wendel, the head of a behavioral science unit at Morningstar, kicked off the investment 
protection panel issuing a call to arms to the investment advice industry. Specifically, Wendel 
outlined three interrelated areas where the industry can improve. To Wendel, the industry should 
(1) define investor success; (2) adopt an individualized idea of the “investor”; and (3) consider 
how financial services institutions, which have their own interests and incentives, utilize 
behavioral findings. Improving in these areas can lead to better client outcomes. 
Wendel first focused on the need to define what success means in the investment advice context. 
Too often, he charged, investor success remains undefined, at the peril of the consumer. Without 
a specific goal in mind, it is difficult to know if fancy new financial literacy programs or brand-
new investment products help or hurt consumers. Despite millions of dollars spent on new 
literature and product lines, Wendel believes consumers often are not better off. Investment 
advisors need to think more deeply about what it means for their clients to achieve investment 
success. 
A second, related point relates to how we define “investor”. Typically, the investment advice 
sector places individuals into buckets based on their risk profile. Wendel posited that big data 
now allows industry players to take a much more individualized approach to understanding their 
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clients by applying behavioral findings. Wendel cited studies indicating, for example, that certain 
groups of people only handle their financial matters on Sunday evenings, whereas other groups 
handle these tasks on Tuesday mornings. Based on the time of day in which researchers targeted 
individuals for, say, signing up for a retirement fund, researchers noted a doubling or tripling of 
consumer engagement. For Wendel, the behavioral research is out there to understand investors 
as a more nuanced, individualized level.  
Wendel’s third point called for researchers to consider the impact interventions and reforms have 
on financial institutions. After all, these financial institutions will only implement reforms that 
make sense from an institutional perspective. It is important, therefore, to balance both consumer 
and institutional interests when thinking about and designing remedies to certain behavioral 
issues. Financial institutions must be able to achieve their own goals while still doing right by 
investors. 
Conflicts of Interest and Disclosure 
Phyllis Borzi, former Assistant Secretary of the 
Department of Labor (DOL) throughout the 
Obama administration, offered a regulator’s take 
on the need for better protections in the investment 
advice space, specifically for conflicts of interests 
between investment advisors and their clients. The 
goal, to Borzi, is to ensure that investors receive 
“objective, simple, understandable, and 
individualized” advice. Unfortunately, investors 
often do not receive objective advice.  
Borzi noted that independent research (i.e., 
research that is not funded by the investment 
advice sector) demonstrates that investors are 
seriously harmed by their advisors’ conflicts of 
interest. Part of the problem relates to the 
“tremendous imbalance between the people who 
hold themselves out as experts … and the people 
who are the recipients of advice.” Investors are 
often unaware of agreements their advisors have 
with third parties that might influence the advice 
they give to consumers, or they might be unable to 
appreciate the impact a conflicted advisor’s advice 
may have on them.  
For regulators, the question is how to overcome 
conflicts and put investment advisors and investors 
on a more level playing field. As other speakers noted, disclosure is not enough. In fact, Borzi 
noted perverse research findings in studies that examined the effects of conflict disclosure on 
Question for the speakers: 
What is your perspective on 
roboinvesting? What opportunities and 
challenges have you seen? 
 Borzi: people learn in different
ways; roboadvisors need to
customize their systems more to
individual needs
 Choi: People dislike
recommendations from
algorithms, even when presented
with data demonstrating their
success
 Wendel: generating sound,
individualized advice through
roboinvesting is nowhere near as
difficult as capturing customers in
the first place
 Niebor: first, digital access needs
to improve; second, roboadvising is
benefitting incumbent banks at
the expense of inviting new
competition into the market
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE SYMPOSIUM SUMMARY PAPER iDEAS42/UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
32 
both advisors and investors. On the investment advisor side, some research as shown that 
advisors were more likely to act on the conflict once it was disclosed; they developed more of a 
“buyer beware” attitude towards their clients. On the consumer side, after an advisor disclosed a 
conflict, investors thought their advisors were “really great people” and people of integrity. The 
disclosure fostered a feeling of trust that made investors more likely to agree with investors’ 
actions, and less likely to push back. Research also demonstrates that investors sometimes feel 
obligated to follow the advice of their advisors because, if they did not, they felt that they were 
implicitly signaling distrust and felt guilty.  
Borzi’s work at the DOL culminated with the contentious fiduciary rule, which expanded the 
definition of an investment advice fiduciary under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974. The rule required that financial advisors act in the best interests of their clients, by 
prioritizing clients’ interests above their own. The rule has been the subject of considerable 
debate, as it would impose significant compliance costs on investment advisors and their firms. 
The Trump administration initially delayed its full implementation to July 2019, pending 
additional review from DOL on its impact on investors’ access to advice and fund accounts.27 In 
March 2018, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that DOL exceeded its authority in 
developing the rule in the first place. In response, DOL stated it would not enforce the rule, 
pending further review.28 
So how do policymakers understand and effectively mitigate unintended consequences? 
The Limits of Nudges 
James Choi, an economics professor at the Yale School of Management, discussed “the limits of 
disclosure nudges,” in a reference to Nudge. To the Nudge authors, “everything matters”—every 
choice architecture decision favors one type of outcome over the other and therefore is not 
neutral. Choi sought to add nuance to the nudge debate by arguing that the impact of certain 
nudges may not align with what choice architects originally intended. 
To demonstrate his point, Choi described a field experiment related to social norms marketing, 
which aims to incentivize certain behaviors by providing people with information about the 
behavior of one’s peers. Choi conducted his own retirement fund experiment to test how 
consumers would respond to social norms. Choi mailed employees that did not fully participate 
in their employer’s 401(k) program a simple plan enrollment or contribution increase form. A 
randomized subset of the forms stated the fraction of age-matched coworkers participating in the 
plan, or age-matched participants contributing at least 6 percent of pay to the plan.  
27 “Presidential Memorandum on Fiduciary Duty Rule.” Presidential Memoranda, issued 3 February 2017.  
28 O’Brien, Sarah. “Labor Department won’t enforce investor protection rule after court decision.” CNBC.com, 
19 March 2018. 
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Previous research, often replicated, show that peer information interventions cause behavior to 
conform to the established norm29. Choi’s study, however, found an opposite effect: the signup 
rate for those who did not receive peer information was 9.9 percent, while the signup rate for 
those who did receive peer information was 6.3 percent.30 Peer information actually discouraged 
conforming to the norm. Upon further examination, Choi discovered the divergence appeared in 
how the recipients’ salaries compared with their peers. Recipients with income below their 
state’s median level may have felt that they were already behind their peers, so they were 
discouraged from starting.  
Experiments like this one demonstrate the complexity of people and decision-making. Nudges 
may work, but Choi believes researchers and policymakers are only at the beginning stages of 
implementing effective nudges. It is important therefore to test every intervention continuously, 
to understand why, when and how nudges work—and in which contexts. Choi also discussed an 
experiment related to the frequency of seeing investment portfolio returns. A classical 
experiment found that seeing portfolio returns often causes people to shy away from taking 
investment risk. Choi noted that seemingly subtle shifts in the experiment’s setting caused the 
result found in the classical experiment to go away.  Because people respond differently in 
depending on the context, as in the savings experiment, it is important for researchers can 
identify true sources of heterogeneity while cutting down on the false positives that often lead 
researchers astray. 
Lessons from the Financial Conduct Authority 
Jeroen Niebor, from the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA, the UK’s main financial 
sector regulator), provided insights from an international financial regulator. The FCA regulates 
how financial institutions interact with and approach customers. Niebor’s role at the FCA is in 
the behavioral economics and data science unit, which works with policymakers to experiment 
and run tests prior to implementing actual policy. 
In explaining the UK’s investment regulatory landscape, Neibor focused on five main areas: (1) 
regulation of the sales process, or how products are sold to consumers; (2) rules related to 
misspelling products; (3) rules related to “misrecommending” products; (4) disclosure rules; and 
(5) screening individuals for product suitability purposes.  
Niebor expanded on a 2012 rule change related to the compensation of investment advisors. 
Prior to the change, advisors did not charge investors for advice sessions, and instead received 
kickbacks from the funds they sold. The change sought to enhance disclosures to investors by 
requiring advisors to charge up-front fees or charge a percentage of the money invested. The rule 
has parallels to the fiduciary rules Phyllis Borzi worked on at the DOL.  
29 Hong, Harrison, et al. “Social Interaction and Stock‐Market Participation.” The Journal of Finance, 59, 
2004, pp. 137-163 
30 Choi, James, et al. “The Effect of Providing Peer Information on Retirement Savings Decisions.” The 
Journal of Finance, 70, 2015, pp. 1161-1201.  
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Regrettably, Niebor noted, the rule change has not yet undergone sufficient evaluation since its 
implementation. Here, Niebor echoed Choi’s suggestion that policymakers and researchers need 
to study constantly the way new rules impact people because sometimes new policies have 
unintended effects. For example, the rule change has led to an “advice gap” in the UK because 
many people do not want to pay up-front for investment services. Niebor noted the rise of robo-
investing as an opportunity to close this gap and provide valuable services to people who might 
otherwise be missing important face-to-face advisor interactions. 
Niebor also discussed the FCA’s requirement of firms to screen individuals before it is able to 
offer investment products defined as ‘complex.’ These products require an ‘appropriateness test’, 
or a determination that an investor can fully comprehend the risk(s) involved in defined complex 
products.31 Similar to the post-implementation period of the 2012 disclosure rule mentioned 
above, Niebor stated that this screening idea has not been properly researched. To him, 
researchers need to take a step back and more clearly define the goal of screening and test the 
best way to achieve particular outcomes, noting, as others at the Symposium had, that sometimes 
policies have unintended and unforeseen effects. 
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND LOOKING AHEAD
As behavioral finance becomes more popular, scholars, researchers and those working in the 
private sector understand that there is significant work yet to be done. As highlighted by many of 
the Symposium’s speakers, many people throughout the world, including many Americans, 
struggle financially. 
For individuals, even getting access to mainstream financial services can be difficult. For those 
that do have access, navigating complex product offerings and resources can leave customers 
frustrated, confused and even less well-off. Organizations have significant work to do to 
understand their customers and to create tailored, individualized product offerings that address 
real-world problems and biases. Regulators must continually test new policies and consider how 
their efforts impact both the institutions they regulate and the constituents they serve. At the 
macro, financial-system level, markets remain susceptible to shocks, and are not as rational as 
traditional economic theory might predict. Economists will continue to try to understand markets 
better, while organizations will help their customers lead better financial lives that help them 
better absorb market dips.  
The Symposium offered a chance for diverse, behaviorally minded stakeholders to convene and 
share their work and ideas. This exchange should propel the next wave of behaviorally informed 
product and market enhancements, which hopefully will lead individuals throughout the world to 
lead healthier and more stable financial lives. 
31 “COBS 10.2 Assessing appropriateness: the obligations,” The FCA Handbook, COBS 10.2.1-10.2.2., last 
updated 1 March 2018. 
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APPENDIX A: LIVE AUDIENCE EXPERIMENTS 
The symposium included three live experiments to allow participants to observe how even well-
informed people, who are in the moment learning about the effects of psychological bias, can 
nonetheless act in conformity with those biases—and conform they did! 
I. Squirrels and Fine Print 
Even before it began, conference registrants participated in an experiment testing the 
effectiveness of disclosure. The CFLP sent an email detailing information on the conference 
three days before the event, including information on the agenda, location, and other logistics. 
Towards the bottom of the email, a small section read: 
MEALS 
*As part of our commitment to a more sustainable environment and positive food choices,
participants will be provided nourishing and sustainable meals which are locally sourced. 
Healthy options for lunch may include, but are not limited to, a desiccated carrot and soy 
cheese sandwich on gluten-free soda bread; squirrel sausage and lentil soup; and other low 
sodium raw food options. If you prefer a more traditional, less healthy meal, you must 
email ekim@ideas42.org no later than September 12, 2017 to opt out. 
Of the more than 500 people that registered for the conference, only five emailed ideas42 asking 
to opt out. Assuming everyone who read the menu would want to opt out, 99 percent of 
registrants did not read the fine print. 
Too often, explained Wright, regulators use disclosure as a cure-all for informational problems. 
A conference looking to nudge consumers in a better direction might have included this question 
up front, in larger font, and as an opt-in rather than opt-out choice. 
II. Brochures and Change Blindness
Humans are even less capable of detecting something is wrong without disclosure. For their next 
experiment, ideas42 set up the registration documents in front of a tall table. Behind that table 
stood one staff member, who would direct the attendees to sign a video release form, and offer to 
retrieve a brochure from behind the table. Once the attendee started to read and sign the release 
form, that staff member would bend down, out of sight, and an entirely different person would 
stand back up a few seconds later to hand them the brochure.  
Only two people in a 40-minute registration period noticed. 
This experiment was repeated with staff members who looked vaguely alike (same gender, race, 
and hair color), and with staff members who looked nothing alike (different gender, race, and 
hair color.) This is called change blindness, or the inability to see a change in your environment. 
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Attendees were distracted by the form they had to sign, so did not notice how, for instance, a 
white man with short hair transformed into an Asian woman with long hair in just a few seconds. 
Humans often think they are better at multitasking than they actually are. We interact with so 
many stimuli at any one time that it is impossible to focus fully on each one: even at a quiet, 
uncomplicated conference registration desk, we get distracted and cannot fully process the world 
around us. If something is critical, this experiment suggests that disclosure alone is not enough. 
So disclosing information—of making people aware of what has changed, since they might have 
missed it—is certainly a good intention. 
III. Fiduciary Rule and Faulty Disclosure
ideas42 first divided the participants into three groups, near three jars containing an equal 
number of jellybeans. Within each group, facilitators split participants into Advisors and 
Estimators, and relegated to opposite ends of the room about thirty feet apart. Each Advisor was 
allowed to view their group’s jar, and was tasked with guessing how many jelly beans it 
contained by writing the number on a piece of paper. Advisors could not discuss their decision-
making with anyone else. After the advisors made their guesses, each facilitator gave an 
Estimator one Advisor’s guess, on which they would base their own estimate. They could not 
clearly see the jar of jelly beans, and had to rely only on the guess they were given. 
Unknown to anyone, each group received different information. The first group, acting as the 
control group, was told both the Advisor and Estimator would win if the Estimator had the most 
accurate guess. This group produced the most accurate estimates. Further, the average guesses of 
both the Advisors and Estimators were close: the mean Advisor guess was 1,455 jelly beans and 
the mean Estimator guess was 1,418 jelly beans. The actual number was 1,227. 
The second group’s Advisors were given a conflict of interest. Those Advisors would win if the 
Estimator had the highest estimate, while those Estimators would only win if they had the most 
accurate. Only the Advisors knew about this conflict—the second group of Estimators had the 
same information as those in first group. These Advisors would be trying to convince the 
Estimators of an inflated number of jelly beans, but without causing suspicion about their 
asymmetric incentives. This group produced a higher average estimate than the first. The mean 
Advisor guess was 2,326, while the mean Estimator guess was 1,084, a difference of 1,242. With 
larger sample sizes, the Estimator guess more closely matches the Advisor’s mean. 
The third group relied on a conflict of interest with disclosure—this time, both parties were 
informed of the conflict. Both the Advisors and Estimators were given the same information 
about who was incentivized to do what. This group produced the highest average guesses for 
both groups: 2,580 for Advisors, and 2,406 for Estimators.  
As Wright put it in the beginning of the conference, “transparency is not always the best 
answer”. The disclosure fostered a feeling of trust between the Advisors and Estimators, but it 
did not cause Advisors to act in the Estimators’ best interest: on the contrary, it gave them 
license to inflate their guess. That original display of honesty made Advisors feel like their duty 
had been done—they then felt free and justified to act in their own best, profit-maximizing 
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interest. The Advisors trusted the Estimators to assume their guess was likely too large, and 
therefore felt no qualms about overestimating. Estimators, in turn, felt like an adjustment had 
already been made to reflect a more honest guess, and took the guess at face value without a 
second thought. 
The jellybean advisors took on the role of financial advisors, and the estimators the investors 
they hold as clients. Before the Department of Labor took action, an undergrad calling herself a 
financial advisor was just as legitimate under the law as anyone else calling themselves a 
financial advisor, jellybean or otherwise. It was the DOL’s fiduciary rule that introduced some 
measure of certification and differentiation within the advisor market, by requiring financial 
advisors to disclose whether or not they are required to act in a client’s best interest. The 
disclosure, however, may introduce trust in a relationship that requires vigilant scrutiny.  
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APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Below are definitions of terms and concepts referenced both in this paper and at the Symposium. 
This is not an exhaustive list of all concepts, but rather representative of the ideas discussed.
Anchor: a number, or other measurement, on 
which consumers make decisions (e.g., a 
credit card’s minimum payment acts as an 
anchor for how much one should pay) 
Attention constraints: difficulty staying 
focused on the present task 
Change blindness: the inability to see a change 
in your environment 
Choice architecture: the design of the 
environments in which people make choices 
Confirmation bias: the tendency to focus on 
information that validates existing beliefs 
Decisional conflict: an issue making decisions, 
when there are too many decisions to make 
Efficient markets hypothesis: states that 
market prices can be explained in terms of 
fundamental metrics (e.g., stock prices are 
only a function of dividend payouts, forecasts 
of future earnings, and other measureable 
values of companies) 
Framing: the way in which information is 
presented (e.g., “10 percent chance of 
winning” or “90 percent chance of losing”) 
Information overload: too much information 
to process, which makes it harder to act 
Libertarian paternalism: people must be free to 
make the choice they want, but institutions 
should design systems that encourage 
healthier choices—an justification for nudges 
Mental accounting: when a person views 
various sources of income as being different 
than others (e.g., thinking of how you would 
spend a birthday check versus wages from one 
additional hour of work) 
Misforecasting: inaccurately forecasting our 
own behavior 
Misperception: wherein a person thinks they 
are in one situation, but are in another 
Moral hazard: the incentive to take on more 
risk by those who do not bear its consequences 
(e.g., if you have bike insurance, you have less 
of an incentive to keep it locked) 
Myopia: disproportionately focused on the 
present, rather than the future 
Narrative economics: adds a sociological 
element to the efficient markets hypothesis,  
examining the narratives that people carry and 
transmit about the overall economy 
Nudges: a gentle push to influence behavior in 
a way that is generally thought to benefit the 
individual 
Poor monitoring: idea that we are not good 
monitors of our own behavior, especially 
when presented with temptation 
Present bias: focusing on the needs and desires 
of the present, rather than long-term gains 
Recency bias: the tendency for people to 
believe what has happened recently will 
continue to happen 
Social norms: establishing how others within a 
similar social group act or behave 
Stickiness: the measure of how easy a decision 
is to change 
